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Abstract
We consider ghetto as a community of people ruled against their will
by an external power. Members of the community feel that their laws are
broken. However, attempts to leave ghetto makes their situation worse.
We discuss the relation of the ghetto inhabitants to the ruling power in
context of their needs, organized according to the Maslow hierarchy. De-
cisions how to satisfy successive needs are undertaken in cooperation with
or defection the ruling power. This issue allows to construct the tree of
decisions and to adopt the pruning technique from the game theory. Dy-
namics of decisions can be described within the formalism of fundamental
equations. The result is that the strategy of defection is stabilized by the
estimated payoff.
PACS numbers: 89.65.-s, 64.90.+b
Keywords: sociophysics; phase transition; mean field; decisions; needs; Maslow
theory
1 Introduction
In human history, violence is continuously with us, despite our optimistic belief
that it is less and less widespread. In our minds, violence of armed against
disarmed people is particularly repulsive. However, still it happens in numerous
places on earth. Perhaps a new element is that all of us are more conscious
of the situation, than ever before. The question is if victims of the violence -
treated as a community - can accept it. If yes, the situation will remain stable;
if not, they will resist, and the violence is expected to spread. This duality -
to resist or not - is especially inevitable in a ghetto, where an escape is not
possible or at least very difficult. Here we are going to attack this problem by
sociophysical methods, i.e. by a construction of an appropriate model.
As a model base, we propose two elements. First is the Maslow theory [1].
Its basic assumption is that people are going to satisfy their needs one after
another, in order from most basic to most sophisticated. Our central question -
the decision of the victims about resistance - is to be considered in the context of
their subsequent decisions how to satisfy their needs. In other words, each vital
decision in the situation of violence is to be made in relation to this violence.
Second element of the model is the mean field approach, as applied to a strike
by Galam, Gefen and Shapir [2]. This approach profits from the analogy to
ferro-paramagnetic transition in the Ising model. In this description, the ferro-
magnetic phase with given orientation of spins is equivalent to a given decision
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(as to take part in a strike or not), made by the majority as a consequence of
social interactions.
This author imagines that the goal of this paper is twofold. First is a recon-
struction of chains of subsequent decisions of people. We apply the decision tree
- a concept from the game theory [3]. This concept is modified here in the sense
that there is only one player. Still, each decision selects a branch, and getting
there defines a new situation. In some cases, estimation of expected payoffs
allows to apply the pruning technique: as the player decides as to get larger
payoff, some branches with very low payoff can be a priori eliminated. The
second goal is to use the obtained scheme to discuss the problem of resistance
in a ghetto.
Historically, ”ghetto” is the area of iron foundry in Venice, where an enclosed
neighborhood was created for Jews in 1516 to protect them against persecution
from Roman Catholic Church. More recently, the term ’ghetto’ is explicitly
assigned to bounded areas in Warsaw, Lodz, Riga, Budapest, Cluj, Terezin and
many others under Nazi rules, where Jewish people were gathered prior to the
Holocaust. In social sciences, the meaning of the term includes also Jewish di-
aspora in early modern Europe, quarters of black Americans in large cities and
some ethnic communities in Africa and East Asia [4]. Although this meaning
remains under dispute [4], attempts to describe ghettos in current world should
at least be remarked [5, 6], not pretending to completeness. Social processes
leading to the formation of ghettos was simulated by [7] and more recently by
[8, 9]. The present work concerns with dynamics of decisions in a ghetto com-
munity. For our purposes, two traits are to be distinguished: i) an attempt of
an inhabitant of ghetto to leave the area makes his situation worse, ii) human
laws, as understood by inhabitants, are broken by an external power. This wide
definition applies to refugee camps as well as settlements in countries controlled
by army, as in Palestine, Tibet, Chechnya and Darfur. Although in most cases
ghettos are inhabited by ethnic minorities, here we do not need to emphasize
this ethnic trait.
To refer to the game theory, below we adopt the abbreviations C and D
(cooperate or defect), although maybe withdraw or resist would be more appro-
priate. In two subsequent sections we introduce the model and we apply it to
the case of ghetto. Last section is devoted to discussion.
2 The model
2.1 Hierarchy of human needs
According to the theory of Maslow, human needs are arranged hierarchically,
from physiological needs, safety, belongingness, to esteem and self-actualization
[1]. People become interested in their safety to the extent of which their physi-
ological needs are satisfied; being safe, they start to struggle for belongingness,
and so on. This author and maybe this reader happened to be born in a milieu
where three first needs were satisfied from the very beginning till adulthood.
However, in numerous cases the situation is less fortuitous. More than often, a
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human unit has to determine a strategy to realize his/her most basic needs in
this or that way. In such a strategy, one of most important decision is which
limitations of human needs are to be accepted [10]. This problem appears to be
even more crucial in ghetto, where the above mentioned limitations are partic-
ularly painful.
Trying to reach its needs in any milieu, a human unit has to consider at
each step the context of situation. In particular, in ghetto the problem of any
action is if it is legal, or - in other words - if this action is allowed by the ruling
power. This remains true when we ask about actions taken up in order to satisfy
human needs at all levels. At the physiological level, to cooperate is equivalent
to join common life in frames of the society, using money, sleeping home and
eating food bought in a market. An alternative is to look for a desolate place
in a forest or a desert, or to form a small community out of or at least at the
border of, say, normal civilization. To continue, at the safety level the problem
is to accept law or not. Whereas in our world of white collars this alternative
is concentrated around payment of taxes, in ghetto the defection can include
uprising, riots, guerilla or terror. At the level of belongingness, we have to
select our group of reference. Again, in ghetto the world is sharply divided
into two: ”we” and ”they”. The power is with ”them”, and the quest is to
identify with whom? Further, at the level of esteem the problem is, in which
group this esteem is looked for? Here we guess that this choice is strongly
correlated with the previous one, and our analysis will be simpler because of this
correlation. Finally, reaching esteem, our human unit tends to self-actualization.
In principle, this again can be expressed as a social action directed against the
power or supporting it. However, consequences of these decisions are usually
less crucial, human behavior at this level is much more individualized and it is
often affective and expressive rather than aim-oriented [11]. That is why the
level of self-actualization is difficult for a sociophysical modelling.
2.2 Tree of decisions
Those who defect at the very root, i.e. at the physiological level, place them-
selves out of frames of the society. It is very hard to defect public access to
water, shops and houses. The alternative is to live wildly in the forest. Yet
this choice happens in several places on Earth, where climatic circumstances
allow to do it at least temporarily and some strong obstacles prevent to live in
accord with law. This kind of defection happens in large social scale only in
societies in strongest crisis, e.g. during a civil war. Although these situations
are of central importance, they will be not discussed here. In a ghetto, there is
no possibility to fight in open way; main splitting of human behavior happens
at higher levels. Then, for the sake of our subject all decisions discussed here
start from C (cooperate).
In the same way we are going to comment further decisions, which form
chains as the one presented in Table 1. This particular chain will be denoted as
CCDDD from now on. In this notation, CD means that we discuss the decision
D (at the safety level) of those who decided C at the physiological level.
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physiology C
safety C
belongingness D
esteem D
self-actualization D
Table 1. A chain of subsequent decisions of a human unit (man or woman):
defect (D) or cooperate (C) with the power.
In Fig.1 a part of the resulting tree of decisions is shown. There, the whole
branch starting from D at the physiological level is omitted, except its begin-
ning. Also, the decisions D or C at the level of self-actualization are not shown
for clarity of the figure.
Omitting the physiological needs, we are going to concentrate on the level
of safety. A population considered selected C as their first choice, i.e. they
decided to live within the community and to profit its facilities. Now and each
time their decision is C or D, i.e. they wonder if their path is to be CC or
CD. The probabilities of these paths depend on the expected payoffs. Then the
choice these people is to decide, if they will be safer when cooperating with the
power of when defecting it.
As it was indicated by Maslow, people are able to struggle for their safety to
the extent in which their physiological needs are satisfied. Further, their search
for belongingness is limited by their lack of safety, and so on. Maslow gives
an example with numbers; an average citizen could have satisfied his successive
needs in 85, 70, 50, 40 and 10 percent, in order as in Table 1. Provided, for
example, that the safety needs of somebody are not satisfied at all, he will not
bother about belongingness, not to speak about esteem or self-actualization. It
is not clear how the effort for a need of next level depends on the satisfaction
of a need in a previous level; the Maslow theory is formulated in words, not in
numbers. The area is open for speculations, with the only condition that any
proposed mathematical formulation reflects the above mentioned rules. On the
other hand it is obvious that the validity of any numbers we can get is limited
to statistical considerations. It seems that for this kind of problems, the funda-
mental equations [12] can provide a proper tool.
2.3 Mathematical formulation
From these equations, we expect to obtain the probabilities that people in a
given situation (read: at a given node of the tree) select this or that decision.
External conditions met by a given community can be introduced as the set of
payoffs αX , describing maximal possible percentage of satisfying needs at node
X of the decision tree. As explained in the caption to Fig. 1, the node index X
is equivalent to a chain of decisions, leading to that node. The root is treated
as the chain of zeroth length. Simultaneously, αX is the maximal amount of
people who are able to struggle for satisfaction of higher needs at nodes XC and
XD. Both these ’maximal’ deal with a virtual case when the payoff is limited
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Figure 1: Right half of the tree of decisions. Last level (self-actualization) is not
shown. Being at the root and selecting C, one is placed at node C; selecting D
as next level one is placed at node CD and so on. Then, nodes at the physiology
level are indexed with one label, D and C from left to right, nodes at the safety
level - by two labels (DD or CD not shown, or CD or CC shown from left to
right), and so on. At the esteem level, first node from the left is indexed as
CDDD.
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neither by parameters of previous nodes, nor by human decisions at these nodes.
Keeping the above example of the chain CCDDD as an individual path, the
value of satisfaction sX of a human unit - member of the community - at node
C (at the physiological level) is then sC = αC . At higher level sX fulfils an
iterative equation
sY = sXαY , (1)
for Y = XC,XD. Provided, that the set sX of satisfaction of our human unit
accords with the above exemplary values given by Maslow, we obtain at five
successive nodes of the path αC = 0.85, αCC = 0.7/0.85 ≈ 0.82, αCCD =
0.5/0.7 ≈ 0.71, αCCDD = 0.4/0.5 = 0.8 and αCCDDD = 0.1/0.4 = 0.25. These
values of αX allow to reproduce via Eq. 1 the above given exemplary chain of
individual satisfactions: sC = 0.85, sCC = 0.7, sCCD = 0.5, sCCDD = 0.4 and
sCCDDD = 0.1.
The above vital path consists successive decisions, for our example CCDDD,
as in Table 1. In reality, these decisions are much more detailed than a coop-
eration with or a defection the ruling power. Actually, the decision can be as
specific as to marry one particular member of a group of revolutionists - or not
to marry. However, having defined our issue - to withdraw or to resist, we are
interested not as in a decision of selecting a detailed person, but - averaging
out over different possibilities - in a decision to be involved in a revolutionistic
group, which is equivalent to satisfying some needs by the choice D.
Up to now, we dealt with individual path. Now we can introduce conditional
probabilities p(C | X) = p(XC)/p(X) and p(D | X) = p(XD)/p(X) that, leav-
ing node X , a human unit is going to C or D. In this case the normalization
condition should be p(C | X)+ p(D | X)+ 1−αX = 1. This should be not con-
fused with a probability that a human unit will stay at node X with probability
1 − αX . Such a formulation would disagree with the original interpretation of
Maslow. Instead, the factor 1− αX measures the amount of effort spent ineffi-
ciently at node X , in the same way as it was assumed for an individual path.
In the latter case, either p(C | X) = 0 or p(D | X) = 0, and the path was fully
determined by subsequent individual decisions. Then, individual satisfaction at
subsequent levels depends only on the payoffs αX , as explained in the second
paragraph of this section. Instead of using the conditional probabilities, it is
simpler to use individual effort wX and averaged effort WX . In the above ex-
ample of individual path, CCDDD, the set of individual efforts is: wC = 1 at
the root, wCC = 1 at the node C, wCCD = 1 at the node CC, wCCDD = 1 at
the node CCD and wCCDDD = 1 at the node CCDD. Other efforts are zero,
either along the decision (as wCD) or because a given node was not reached by
a given human unit (as wDD).
Averaging over individual paths, we get a set of average amounts of effortWX
at all nodes X . Then for the physiological level we have WC +WD = 1. The
average satisfactions at the physiological level, X = C,D, are SC = WCαC ,
and SD = WDαD. Considering the safety level we take into account that
efforts to reach the nodes CC and CD are reduced because αC ≤ 1. Then,
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WCC +WCD =WCαC , and similarly WDC +WDD =WDαD. As a rule,
WXC +WXD =WXαX , (2)
where XC and XD are nodes available from node X by decision C or D. The
whole set WX is equivalent to a map of social efforts, put into various ways
of attempts of satisfying the needs. At each node, the average satisfaction
SX = WXαX ≤ WX . Satisfaction is less or equal than effort, for individual
paths as well as in the average.
In a deterministic picture, people are expected to select always the nodes
with larger payoff. However, it is clear even for a physicist that in reality people
have their individual preferences, and a common payoff for everybody can be in-
troduced only for a statistical description. This intuition on individual character
of payoffs is confirmed by the utility theory [3]. Working in statistical physics,
we are tempted to use some noise as a measure of, say, lack of information of the
community members. Then we expect that the ratio WXC/WXD in stationary
state depends on β(αXC − αXD), where β = 0 for absolute lack of information
on the payoffs, and β is large when the information is well accessible. From
this point, it is only one step to mimic the statistical mechanics, writing the
stationary probability of selecting C from node X
p(XC)eq =
WXC
αXWX
∝ exp [β(αXC − αXD)], (3)
and to postulate a dynamic description in the form of fundamental (or Master)
equation
dp(XC, t)
dt
= −r(XC)p(XC, t) + r(XD)[1− p(XC, t)], (4)
where r(XC) ∝ p(XC)eq . Here, the constant of proportionality determines the
timescale of the dynamics. The dynamics of the probabilities p(X) is equivalent
to the dynamics of efforts WX .
In, say, a standard society the information on the payoffs is well accessible
and the successive selections are almost deterministic. Then, people who decide
to live in a wild forest are rare exceptions in the society: almost everybody
selects C at the physiological level. It is less clear if the payoffs for those
who break law are indeed smaller than for the others. In any case, a great
effort is paid to ensure the population that sooner or later this payoff will be
strongly reduced. Because of this effort, the statistical data on the choice of
CD are usually less sure. Looking for belongingness and needs of higher order
is not directly connected with our issue; anyway, in democratic systems we
are partially involved into the ruling power, which cannot then be treated as
external and is maybe not entirely against our will. Summarizing this section,
this author believes that the concept of the decision tree, as an adaptation of
the Maslow hierarchy, can be useful in many issues.
7
3 The case of ghetto
As it is expected to be clear from the definition of ghetto, accepted above, the
key point of the decision tree is the node C, where crucial decision is to be taken:
CC or CD. The reason is as follows. All what we know about ghetto confirms
that there, it is almost impossible to satisfy the safety need. The payoff of a
useful solution CC is drastically reduced with respect to other communities.
Examples of this painful truth fill newspapers and TV or, even worse, remain
unknown if information is prohibited. To bring these examples here, athough
justified from the point of view of the subject, would drive us too far from so-
ciophysics. Instead, let us consider the consequences for the payoff.
Imagine that the safety is strongly reduced in an initially normal society.
The reason can be war or revolution, or other abrupt fall of the political sys-
tem. It is clear that the accessibility of information deteriorates, and in this
situation many people do not know what to do. What is the payoff if I with-
draw? if I resist? who will win? what will be the consequences for me? my
family? my assets? and so on. As a rule, a remarkable percentage of people
resist, just because - a physicist would say - large entropy in the system. This
thermodynamic formulation should not be offending to anyone. Obviously, it
does not comprise individual decisions, which are sometimes dramatic and full
of unanswered questions. It is a common experience that we decide, not know-
ing the final results; in most difficult situations, the amount of information is
too low to allow for a logical reasoning. This experience is encoded in soci-
ology as the law of unforeseen consequences [13]. However, here we consider
the case when finally some power, external for the ghetto inhabitants, prevails
and the information on payoffs becomes more clear. But the above mentioned
group keeps resisting; despite the variety of their motivations, their effort can
be translated into numbers and handled by statistical tools. They fight against
the external power and its supporters - the mechanism known too well, indeed.
Relaxing to the stationary state, the system finds that the payoff of the choice
CC is reduced by an expected repression by the resisting group. The ruling
power tries to balance this repression by defeating the resistance fighters. Soon,
the level of aggression of both sides becomes equivalent; both find convenient
justifications.
This author believes that what can be said mathematically, can be said -
although longer - in words. Here we try the opposite way. Violence bears vio-
lence - this sentence is short. In sociophysical language, the same content can be
expressed as a stability of the solution of Eq. 4, characterized by the condition
αCC < αCD. This stability relies on the following premises: i) the payoff αCC
is drastically lowered by the repressive actions of the resistant group, ii) strug-
gling for their safety, people are not motivated to select CC instead of CD, if
αCC < αCD, iii) selection of CD in a social scale reinforces the resistant group.
As we see, this closed circle does not rely on a particular choice of the functional
dependence of the effort w on the payoff α. In fact, the resistant group can be
compared to a nucleation center, which initiates the new phase. However, the
nucleation process cannot be described within the simplest version of the mean
field theory, used here.
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As a result, the whole tree becomes degenerated. For those who decided to
resist, it is not possible to look for belongingness or esteem out of the resistant
group. On the other hand, those who select CC remain under fear of, from
one side, being accused of treason and, from the other side, blind actions of the
ruling power. Not being able to get safety, they follow the solidarity with the
resistant group, whey they look for belongingness and esteem. As a rule, when
the safety is at risk, no effort can be put to struggle for higher needs. In effect,
upper branches disappear.
Trying to illustrate the above processes with some simulations, we need the
values of several parameters, as the payoffs at the nodes etc. Measurement of
these parameters or at least a thorough discussion of their values far excesses
the frames of this work - in social sciences, this is almost an euphemism. In-
stead, we can present a qualitative consequences of an abrupt change of ruling
power. The event is a special and most simple example of what was discussed
before. We limit the calculations to the safety level. In the formalism devel-
oped above, the dynamics of this level does not depend on the parameters on
higher levels. In the calculations, the difference of the payoffs consists two fac-
tors: external ∆ (provided by the ruling power, old or new) and internal, due
to interaction between the community members. The latter is proportional to
the actual difference of efforts, WCD −WCC . This proportionality encodes the
above discussed positive feedback between the value of the difference of efforts
and its time derivative. In fact, this positive feedback is at the core of the mean
field theory [14].
To simulate the change of the ruling power (for example, from a well-
established to an external), two agents cannot be omitted: a strong decrease
of αC , which is a direct consequence of unavoidable war, and a change of sign
of ∆. Simultaneously, the up-to-now cooperators become defectors and the op-
posite. We keep the node D unoccupied (WC = 1 and WD = 0); this reflects
the assumed fact that nobody can leave the ghetto. For simplicity we keep the
parameter β constant in time, although it is almost surely not realistic; still we
are left with three parameters. The value of αC before the political overthrow
is assumed to be unity. Its value after the overthrow, kept constant in time, is
one of the parameters. The remaining parameters are β and ∆. Initial ratio
of the variables WCC and WCD is taken as their ratio at equilibrium before
the overthrow. As a rule, WCD > WCC at initial time, because most people
supported the ancient regime before the overthrow; what was the cooperation,
now is treated as defection, and the opposite.
In Fig. 1 we show the effort WCD put at the resistance, against the satisfac-
tion αC of the physiological needs at node C. These data are for the stationary
state. As remarked above, we assume that all the social effort at the root is
put to satisfy physiological needs within the community. However, these needs
can be satisfied only partially. The parameter αC measures the level of this
satisfaction. Further, it measures also the effort which can be put to struggle
for safety, in this (CC) or that (CD) way. The parameters for the plot are:
β = 3.0, and ∆ = 0.2.
As we see in Fig. 1, there is a jump of the data on WCD near αC = 0.7.
Below this value, the effort put to resistance is negligible. Above this value, it
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Figure 2: The effort WCD put at the resistance at the safety level against the
parameter αC .
is close to its maximal value αC . This means that the initial state of resistance
is stable. The results are typical, as long as β is not too small, and ∆ is not too
large. Within the magnetic analogy, the results mean that the metastable phase
is possible as long as the field (∆) and the temperature (1/β) are not too large.
Within the sociophysical picture, it means that it is advantageous for the ruling
power to keep the whole ghetto community at the limit of starvation i.e. with
small value of satisfaction αC of physiological needs. Then, instead of fighting,
they are kept in a queue for water and flour, provided by the army. Then, the
best thing is to make a movie and show it in TV news; those who get water
are happy. Please do not blame this author for the invention - it is known for a
long time.
4 Discussion
Our conclusions are to be divided in three parts. The first is sociophysical.
Our mathematical description is equivalent to the mean-field theory of the fer-
romagnetic phase, where two stable solutions coexist [14]. This model is well
established in applications of physics to social sciences [2, 15]. It is known that
the stability of the ferromagnetic phase is overestimated by mean field theory; in
fact, it depends on the structure. Here we are faced with the question, what is a
realistic structure of a community. Much effort has been done by sociologists to
advance our knowledge on the subject; however, even the characteristic size of
social networks remains under dispute [16, 17]. On the other hand, stability of
ordered Ising phase at low temperatures has been found in computer simulations
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for most of investigated structures [18, 19, 20, 21], with directed Albert-Baraba´si
networks [22, 23] and one-dimensional chains and related models [24] as excep-
tions. Actually, time dependence of persisting opinion of a resistant group was
discussed recently by [25] on the basis of one-dimensional Ising model. (We note
that the condition of low temperature is equivalent to large value of the uncer-
tainty factor β in our considerations.) For social applications, the condition of
an eternal stability of the ferromagnetic phase can be substituted by a weaker
condition of appearance of long-living ordered domains. We can conclude that
sociophysical arguments work for this hypothesis, and not against it.
The second conclusion is aimed to be sociological. The results of our analysis
indicate, that when an external power struggles for control of an isolated com-
munity, the problem of safety remains crucial. Obvious aim of the power must
be: to guarantee the safety for still neutral part of the community. If this is not
possible, war becomes eternal, without winners. Not so rarely, the responsabil-
ity for safety of isolated communities remains in hands of army, without control
of civil agencies or free press. This is precisely what eliminates the possibility of
a peaceful solution; army people are trained to fight, not to bring safety. In so-
ciology, the role of safety is known for a long time: first edition of the Maslow’s
book [1] appeared in 1954. The advantage of this work is to express it in more
formalized language. One could ask if such a formulation is worthwhile. On the
other hand, still some powerful people seem not to recognize the validity of the
conclusions of Maslow theory. Maybe they will be convinced by mathematics.
In my last word I declare to share the opinion that ghettos are shameful for
human civilisation. Nevertheless this respectable and rather common opinion,
such places exist, as we are mercilessly informed by free media. Some people
even claim, that some of these places are established to protect our laws to free
life, where at the last level of the tree of decisions we can write our sociophysical
papers. If this is done without care about safety of the ghetto inhabitants, the
way is destructive and mindless.
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